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Human Rights in the Lion’s Den: 
Law, Politics, Policy and Witness 
Protection in Rio de Janeiro 
MARCUS VAB DE MATOS AND  
ANDREA SEPÚLVEDA* 
This article is a case study in which we want to put to the test 
the very notion that human rights can be improved by 
government policy. To achieve this goal we will examine the 
problematic relationship between human rights and public 
policy that emerged in the implementation of the Witness and 
Victims Protection Programme (PROVITA) in Rio de Janeiro 
between 2010 and 2011. We argue that only when we take a 
critical perspective of human rights discourse and use it to 
turn government institutions against themselves, can we ever 
make any serious advance in protecting human rights. We 
will put this theory to the test by analysing one case: the case 
of ‘Daniel’, which tested witness protection policies in Rio de 
Janeiro to its limits. Such limits are usually borderline places 
between statutes, administrative law, public policies, police 
institutions, NGOs and political parties. In the Brazilian 
context, they also revolve around a subtle and dangerous 
relationship between organised crime and government 
security forces. Emergency situations, as the study will 
illustrate, may go beyond political agreements, shortening 
negotiations, crossing borders between the legal and illegal, 
and expanding policy through an almost dialectic tension. 
There is very limited information about this kind of policy 
(witness protection), and this justifies the need for research 
and the analysis of case-related evidence. 
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Introduction 
In this article we discuss the Programa de Proteção a Vítimas e 
Testemunhas Ameaçadas de Morte [Witness and Victims Protection 
Programme] (PROVITA) in Rio de Janeiro, and its implementation 
in public policy that was in place from 2010 to 2011, with a focus 
on the ‘Daniel’ case that tested decision makers to the limit and 
created the environment for new solutions.1 Our objective is to 
analyse the close, risky and often contradictory relationship between 
the stark reality of having a widely corrupt police force that often 
acts as a human rights violator on the one hand, and a weakened 
human rights governmental structure built to deal with precisely 
those human rights violations on the other. This scenario is 
worsened by the circumstance that the very implementation of the 
PROVITA depends largely on the police. 
This scenario would be sufficiently challenging by itself, as it 
puts to the test the manner of implementation—and effectiveness—
of human rights as a public policy with the aim of protecting the 
rights to life and personal security of the person. However, in Brazil, 
one could add additional layers of contradictions leading to 
increased difficulties in the implementation of such human rights 
public policy. Legislation, for example, was not thought out in a 
systematic manner, which would have been more conducive to 
bridging some of the gaps arising from the coexistence of statutes 
with clashing rules and purposes—those established under a 
neoliberal state institutional framework,2 sharing the space with 
some welfare oriented ones.3 As a result of such non-systematic 
legislation, any public official attempting to implement the witness 
protection programme in line with a human rights public policy 
                                                
1 Information contained in this paper is in accordance to Brazilian Federal Statute 
N. 9.807/1999, therefore all confidential data will be treated accordingly. Names 
and places have been changed to make that possible. 
2 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2007). 
3 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito, Law and 
Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University 
Press 2005) 236. 
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would be faced with considerable constraints arising from legally 
established controls on governmental spending.4 However essential 
those measures are,5 the protection of life and security of the person 
should be strongly considered to permit some leeway to allow 
effective compliance with human rights legislation.6 
These contradictions emerge strongly in the disparity between 
the lack of resources of government agencies in the Executive 
branch, and the broader federal legislative structure built by 
Brazilian Administrative Law and its Federal Constitution.7 This lack 
is then, not only of financial resources, but also of procedural 
measures and infra-legislative guidance at the State and Municipal 
(local government) levels. We will be looking at these broader 
national challenges for the Brazilian Federation by focusing on how 
they emerged at the State level in Rio de Janeiro.  
This article focuses on the Secretaria Estadual de Assistência 
Social e Direitos Humanos [State Secretary of Social Assistance and 
Human Rights] (SEASDH), and we hope our case study will 
highlight the need to improve SEASDH’s infrastructure design, 
                                                
4 Take, for example, the ‘Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal’ [the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act] (LFR)—which is formally known as the Complementary Statute No. 101 and 
the Federal Statute No. 8,666/1999, which establishes bidding and auction 
procedures for governmental contracts. 
5 To clarify, we are not arguing against measures for the protection of governmental 
financial health. 
6 The relevant human rights statute in this case is the Federal Statute No. 9,807 of 
1999, which establishes rules for the implementation of PROVITA in Brazil. It is 
worth noting that Article 70 establishes quite resource demanding obligations on 
the state, in order to effectively protect threatened individuals and their families, 
such as putting in place home security strategies, including security gadgets; secure 
transfers to new places of residence, or to places of work; monthly financial 
allowances for subsistence needs when the person is prohibited from securing a 
livelihood through work; social, psychological and medical assistance; and support 
for any civil and administrative commitments. 
7 Here its perhaps interesting to note that, although Brazilian legislation generally 
follows the model of civil law systems, it is peculiar in terms of how administrative 
law is enacted: there is no ‘code’ of administrative law, as one would expect. 
Administrative law at state and local levels follows the Federal Statute No. 
9,784/1999. To understand a bit more about this issue, see: Marçal Justen Filho, 
Curso de direito administrativo (Editora Revista dos Tribunais 2013). 
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administration and staff allocation for PROVITA and other 
protection programmes.  
Our method is what one can call ‘participatory observation’—
following, for example, Jose Vargas,8 where the observer is located 
inside the observed ‘group’ or community. Or, as we might say in 
this case, when the observer is ‘caught’ by an apparatus: a network 
of power relations determined by government bodies, police officers, 
NGOs, realpolitik, the media, and people threatened with death.9 
This method, which is directly applied by anthropologists in 
ethnographic studies, ‘requires that researchers simultaneously 
observe and participate (as much as possible) in the social action 
they are attempting to document’.10 At the same time, we concede 
the methodological contradiction of attempting to maintain enough 
intellectual distance from our object of study—as if that would 
enable us to undertake a critical analysis of it—and describing events 
in which we took part.  
However, there seems to be no other way of addressing this 
issue. There is an insurmountable lack of information and scholarly 
debate on witness protection policies and programmes globally.11 
This is probably for the most obvious reasons: fear that giving out 
information on the programmes might expose the network of 
protection and put at risk the witnesses under protection. On the 
other hand, one might ask if this is perhaps not the reason for the 
lack of public engagement and improvement in budget and policies 
                                                
8 José Vargas, Sociologia, (1st edn, Porto Editora 2002) 119-20. 
9 Giorgio Agamben, ‘What Is an Apparatus?’ and Other Essays (Stanford University 
Press 2009). 
10 Lynne Hume and Jane Mulcock, Anthropologists in the Field: Cases in Participant 
Observation (Columbia University Press 2004) vi. 
11 Any research on the topic will lead to the discovery of a few related and non-
related studies about different programmes. Most of these studies focus on criminal 
justice issues, rather than human rights or public policy. See, for example: Scottish 
Office, Towards a Just Conclusion: Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses in Scottish 
Criminal and Civil Cases (Scottish Office 1998). For other examples, see Nicholas R 
Fyfe, Protecting Intimidated Witnesses (Ashgate 2001); and Mitch Morrissey and 
Steven R Siegel, ‘Denver District Attorney’s Office Witness Protection Program’ 
(2015) Prosecutor, Journal of the National District Attorneys Association, 1 
January 2015 <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-436332394.html> accessed 27 
October 2016.  
Marcus VAB de Matos and Andrea Sepúlveda 
101 
of these programmes.12 Here we are looking to fill this gap in the 
academic debate by bringing forward a case study on the topic. 
After all, the protection of people whose lives are threatened 
due to collaboration with the judicial system should be considered as 
one of the most basic and important roles of the state (or 
government). This statement is commonplace in international law— 
where it could be understood to arise from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—as it is in the 
Brazilian 1988 Federal Constitution (article 144). This notion is 
based, firstly, on a shared body of principles, according to which the 
protection of life and individual fundamental rights is supposed to be 
granted by member states. 13  Secondly, it derives from the very 
principle that proposes that ‘public security’ in Brazil, as well as 
individuals’ physical safety, is a ‘duty of the state, right and 
responsibility of all’.14 
Nevertheless, the concept of protection may vary depending on 
the gravity, nature and objects of risk and protection—who or what 
is under threat—especially depending on the availability of public 
policy and resources of protection programmes. In Brazil, the federal 
Union, as well as most of the federate States, have several different 
ways of protecting people under threat: from simply monitoring 
witnesses’ situations, to a change of identity and removal from their 
original place of residence in extremely serious situations. Although 
witness protection is considered an essential and integral policy, 
legislation and law making are hard to develop because they apply to 
several different federate political levels and public bodies and are 
frequently inadequate, as we will see further. But before we look at 
policy, police and the violation of human rights, we should perhaps 
say a little more about the theory behind our study. 
                                                
12 Brazil is no exception in this case. There are very few studies on the topic. For an 
interesting study on PROVITA, see Cássia Maria Rosato, ‘Subjetividades 
Ameaçadas: Mudança de Nome de Testemunhas Protegidas’ (2013) Estudos de 
Psicologia<http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=26128209012> accessed 27 
October 2016. 
13 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, Art 7. 
14 Brasil Constituição Federal, Art. 144. 
Birkbeck Law Review Volume 4(1) 
102 
We are fully aware that human rights have been transformed 
from a rebellious and seditious discourse into a discourse for 
government and state legitimacy. As Costas Douzinas puts it: theory 
and action on human rights have been officially given to 
‘triumphalist journalists’, ‘bored diplomats’ and ‘wealthy 
international jurists’. 15  Following Conor Gearty, we agree that 
human rights and democracy are the ‘two big ethical ideas to emerge 
victorious from the short twentieth century’, and that they ‘do not 
naturally fit together’.16 Sometimes democratic ways of choosing 
representative government and their ways of investing money in 
public policies—through administrative law and bureaucratic 
procedure—‘inevitably’ clash with human rights, not only on the 
practical, but also on the theoretical level. 17  It is from these 
theoretical perspectives that we will put human rights practices to 
the test. 
Our research therefore examines human rights from a critical 
perspective. Considering these difficulties—factual, administrative 
and legal—does it make a difference for the effectiveness of the 
implementation of PROVITA that those in charge of it were 
personally committed to the human rights cause and thus compelled 
to act within such a difficult environment in a near ‘rebellious’ 
manner?18 In more general terms, is it relevant for the success of 
human rights public policies that ‘human rights militants’ join the 
bureaucratic machine of the government and, moved by a very 
peculiar and fragile political scenario, short-circuit them, and then 
make them turn, finally, in another direction, towards better human 
rights compliance? Is it then possible to make ‘human rights’ again a 
rebellious discourse (and practice)? Or does bureaucratic 
procedure—by the means of realpolitik and administrative law—
always ‘neutralise’ human rights, turning them into fragile and low-
                                                
15 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Thought at the Turn of the 
Century (Bloomsbury 2000) 7. 
16 CA Gearty, ‘Spolis for which Victor? Human Rights within the Democratic State’ 
in CA Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Human 
Rights Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 214-15. 
17 ibid 216. 
18 Douzinas 345. 
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cost policies in the same way a legal positivist interpretation of law 
tries to manage the ‘language of Rights’?19  
It seems that, when SEASDH took responsibility for 
PROVITA, it became clear that they did not have the infrastructure, 
staff and financial resources necessary to adequately handle human 
rights emergency cases. And it also became clear that it was 
impossible for the same team of people to handle all the bureaucratic 
procedures, the necessary political negotiation and the emergencies 
because they had become a new powerful player in the ‘witness 
protection’ game: the more cases they solved, the more cases would 
be sent to them. However, one case would make them challenge the 
whole bureaucracy by turning abstract hypothetical subjects of 
protection into a concrete, urgent, problem-solving request on an 
individual’s behalf.  
By creating a creative institutional space for challenging the 
context and the limitations (both in budget and personnel) that they 
were dealing with, SEASDH officers were able to plan and think of 
possible practices to solve those challenges—although, as we will see, 
those plans never really took off.  
It might be the case that the implementation of human rights 
public policies, particularly those challenging ones such as 
PROVITA, must be pushed forward through windows of 
opportunities created by interested and committed officers willing to 
transform insurmountable problems into notable advances. This 
would amount to a method that departs from the constant and slow 
incremental process that notoriously permeates social policies in 
Brazil.  
However, before we can put this assertion to the test, we will 
explain the context in which these challenges emerge. After that we 
will focus on the legal framework and institutional design of 
PROVITA, and finally, we will look at the case of ‘Daniel’ and how 
it re-shaped human rights policies. 
                                                
19 ibid. 
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Rio de Janeiro ‘Is not for Beginners’: 
Political Parties, Administrative Law, Drugs,  
Guns, Militias and (Possibly) Human Rights 
We begin with a brief contextual outline of Rio de Janeiro security 
and human rights policies. The state of Rio de Janeiro was—and still 
is in many ways—a place of extremes.20 Not only a place where 
extreme poverty meets extreme wealth in a national context; it is 
also a place where a kind of globalised economics made it possible to 
buy drugs and weapons of war—either Russian, European or North 
American—on an extremely pervasive scale. During the 1990s, the 
combination of drug and gun dealing with extreme poverty turned 
Rio’s many slums into places owned by criminal factions with highly 
technological warfare—AK-47, AR-15, grenade-launcher and anti-
aircraft guns were commonplace in the teenage vocabulary in many 
slums.21 That was a cause and, at the same time, a result of police 
and state corruption, which had become intertwined with drug and 
gun dealing activity.22 In many cases, this state of affairs resulted in 
an even worse problem: the organisation of so called ‘milicias’, 
where police officers would lay ‘siege’ to entire communities, impose 
their own taxation and force votes for politicians of their choice, 
organising themselves as huge ‘Mafias’.23 
We are not going to present detailed data on this because it has 
already become commonplace for those familiar with the Brazilian 
and Latin American context. It is the case that what we are 
describing has become so well known that the stories of those who 
                                                
20 Zuenir Ventura, Cidade partida (Companhia das Letras 1994). 
21 Maria Alves and Philip Evanson, Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drug 
Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro (Temple University Press 2011). 
22 Diogo Azevedo Lyra, Relatório Rio: Violência Policial E Insegurança Pública 
(Justiça Global 2004). For an English translation, see 
<http://www.observatoriodeseguranca.org/files/rio_report1.pdf> accessed 7 
November 2017.  
23 For a better understanding of the problem, see: ‘Relatório Final da Comissão 
Parlamentar de Inquérito destinada a Investigar a Ação de Milícias no Âmbito do 
Estado do Rio de Janeiro’ (Resolução No. 433/2008). 
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live these experiences are retold through fiction24—like Luiz Eduardo 
Soares’ books, 25  Fernando Meirelles’ City of God film and José 
Padilha’s two major Elite Squad movies, 26  which are now 
(problematically) considered to be evidence of this present 
situation.27 Instead we are going to focus on the institutional and 
political choices that made it possible for the witness protection 
programme (PROVITA) to become what it is now—including many 
choices made through accident, experience or ‘necessity’.28  
But one should note that the sources we use to explain the 
situation in Rio de Janeiro, this situation did not emerge 
immediately. It was the result of historical processes and cumulative 
factors that resulted in the growth of urban populations and the 
                                                
24 We are following here both the methods of Law and Film, and Law and 
Literature, developed in Critical Legal Studies since the 1970s; and also the visual 
culture scholars – such as Bauldrillard, Paul Virilo, MacLuhan, etc – who would 
claim that the ‘real’ is now (on postmodern conditions) completely determined by 
its relation to a ‘hyper-reality’(which is constructed by fiction). 
25 For the intricate links between drug and weapons dealing, and police corruption, 
see: Luiz Eduardo Soares, André Batista, and Rodrigo Pimentel, Elite Squad 
(Weinstein Books 2008). For the following consequences of how that opened up 
the possibility for the organisation of so-called ‘milicias’, see: Luiz Eduardo Soares 
et al., Elite da Tropa 2 (Nova Fronteira, n.d.). 
26 Elite Squad [DVD] (2007). The famous Captain Nascimento character says in Elite 
Squad that the police were ‘badly trained and badly paid. And people like that 
should not go out in the streets carrying guns’.  
27 To understand the depth of the relationship between José Padilha’s movies and 
the problematic contribution of police officers to make the films ‘realistic’, see: 
Marcus VAB de Matos, ‘Direito e Estado de Exceção: Dispositivos, Arquétipos e 
Semelhanças nas Imagens de Tortura e Vigilância do Cinema Contemporâneo. 




accessed 27 October 2016. 
28 According to Paula Kapp, ‘by the end of November 2010, militias had control of 
41.5 % of the 1,006 slums in Rio de Janeiro, compared with 55.9% controlled by 
drug factions, and 2.6% controlled by the State Government UPP—Pacifying Police 
Unit’. ‘O Programa de Proteção a Vítimas e Testemunhas Ameaçadas—PROVITA: 
Indicativos de Análise na Perspectiva Dos Direitos Humanos’ in Cadernos de 
Direitos Humanos (SEASDH 2011). For further information, see Núcleo de 
Pesquisas das Violências da Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro—UERJ 
<http://www.ims.uerj.br/nupevi/> accessed 27 October 2016. 
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deepening of inequality.29 These factors include the growth of the 
economy, the availability of welfare policies for the redistribution of 
income,30 and, specifically, the ideas, ideologies and understanding 
of politicians and political parties of what the role of public security 
policies and police forces were in this context.31  
Since the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, federate states are 
faced with two major challenges in administrative law, which have 
affected the whole public administration. One is the Lei de 
Responsabilidade Fiscal [the Fiscal Responsibility Act] (LFR)—
which is formally the Complementary Statute No. 101. The second 
is the Federal Statute No. 8,666/1999, which establishes bidding and 
auction procedures. They are both considered very effective in terms 
of establishing limits to government expenditure on personnel and 
supplies, but they both imposed very strict procedures and 
bureaucratic measures that slowed decision-making and policy 
implementation—especially when considering public security and 
human rights policies.  
For our case, is important to say that the Fiscal Responsibility 
Statute (LRF) establishes that federate states cannot spend more than 
60% of their revenue on personnel costs. That leaves little choice for 
federate state governments dealing with the need to hire personnel 
but to sign partnership contracts with companies or NGOs—who 
will, in the end, hire their own staff to work for that branch of 
public service, without causing an ‘official’ increase of government 
staff. This is despite the fact that public officers—which includes the 
whole police force (military and civil), firefighters, teachers, judicial 
analysts, judges and technical staff—in the executive secretariat was 
mostly composed of political supporters, and very few could be 
considered technicians or specialists in their own field. 
                                                
29 Gilberto Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian 
Civilization. (University of California Press 1986). 
30 Carlos Lessa, O Rio de Todos os Brasis: Uma Reflexão Em Busca de Auto-estima 
(Editora Record 2001). 
31 Surprisingly enough, the amount of investment in the state and local level doesn’t 
seem to change from one state to another in relation to the supposed difference in 
ideology between different political parties in the political scenario. In this sense, 
see Iris Gomes dos Santos et al., ‘A Política de Segurança Pública No Brasil: Uma 
Análise Dos Gastos Estaduais (1999-2010)’ (2015) 21(1) Opinião Pública 105. 
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That was the case in 2010 when, facing re-election, Governor 
Sergio Cabral, a member of the Partido do Movimento Democrático 
Brasileiro [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party] (PMDB), 
appointed a ‘technician’ to be the state secretary of human rights and 
social assistance, the head of SEASDH. In the government party 
coalition, SEASDH was supposed to be offered to a member of 
Partido dos Trabalhadores [Worker’s Party] (PT) in Rio de Janeiro. 
However, due to the election rules, all party members who ran for 
election in parliament—at any level—had to leave their positions 
inside the executive branch. Therefore, Cabral chose Ricardo 
Henriques, a member of the PT who was not one of the names in the 
Rio de Janeiro party coalition. Henriques then risked making the 
political situation even more fragile by deciding to appoint Pedro 
Strozenberg as his undersecretary of human rights—who was then 
close to Marcelo Freixo (state MP, leader of the opposition to 
Cabral’s government) from the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade 
[Socialism and Freedom Party] (PSOL), and also a well-known 
lawyer and head of an important human rights NGO. Strozenberg 
then chose very interesting cabinet personnel, mostly composed of 
university specialists or experienced technicians from NGOs—most 
of them experiencing their first time in ‘government’, and maybe 
naïve and amateur, as critics would put it. Inside this cabinet, he 
created the Superintendência de Defesa e Promoção de Direitos 
Humanos [Superintendence of Defence and Promotion of Human 
Rights] (SDPDH), an office responsible for dealing with the most 
serious violations of human rights and administering programmes to 
face a broad number of issues: witness, child and human rights 
activists protection programmes (including PROVITA); human 
trafficking and slavery; refugees; right to memory; torture; and the 
design of a new human rights state council and plan. As one of their 
first measures, they made propositions for research and monitoring 
of human rights data that had, so far, never been produced in Rio—
one of those being Paula Kapp’s article in the ‘Human Rights Notes 
Project’.32 
This strange, creative and interesting experience in SEASDH 
lasted only until the elections—almost six months. After being re-
                                                
32 Kapp (n 28). 
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elected, Cabral dismissed Henriques and gave back the head of 
SEASDH for nomination by the PT. The party then appointed 
Rodrigo Neves, party leader in the state assembly, to SEASDH. 
Neves, who is both a historical friend and political rival of Marcelo 
Freixo, chose Antonio Carlos Biscaia—former MP and retired public 
prosecutor and national secretary of public security—as his 
undersecretary of human rights. As this was a considerably radical 
change, the dismissal of a great number of personnel was expected. 
Nevertheless, many technicians were retained and were given 
important roles in the structure of SEASDH during the Biscaia 
administration. And—most importantly for the objectives of this 
article—Biscaia maintained the structure of the Superintendence of 
Defence and Promotion of Human Rights (SDPDH) and appointed a 
public defender (or public lawyer)—a ‘career state official’—to head 
it.33 This was the condition necessary to sustain, develop and make 
several improvements to the SDPDH, as well as to its programmes 
and objectives.  
In addition to the political differences at the party level, the 
complex management of human rights policies and particularly 
witness protection programmes also require an institutional 
collaboration between different governmental agencies of the three 
powers (executive, legislative and judiciary) and across the three 
levels of the federation. Implementing and developing protection 
programmes was, on the national level, the responsibility of the 
presidency of the republic, under the (now extinct) Secretaria de 
Direitos Humanos [Secretariat of Human Rights] (SDH), the 
Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública [National Secretariat of 
Public Security] (SENASP), the Força Nacional de Segurança 
[National Security Force], and its co-related government bodies on 
the federate state level. 
In the state of Rio de Janeiro, public security and protection 
programmes were under the joint responsibility of the Secretaria de 
Segurança Pública [State Secretariat of Public Security] (SESEG), as 
                                                
33 This was Andrea Sepúlveda, one of the authors of this paper. Andrea has been in 
office since 14 March 2011, and is still there after the change of secretariat due to 
elections. She is now the head of the secretariat of human rights, as undersecretary 
of SEASDH. 
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well as the SEASDH. The first is responsible for commanding and 
selecting agents and officers to provide police and security measures 
to witness protection programmes, and the latter is to manage, 
coordinate, monitor and propose political decisions for life 
protection programmes.  
Although the challenges of implementing human rights and 
witness protection programmes in these contexts are immense, and 
there are currently lots (hundreds) of necessary improvements still to 
be made to them, we want to take account of what has been done in 
the period of 2010–11. Underlying this attempt is an idea that, even 
though many of the improvements that are mentioned here are not 
in place anymore—either due to changes in the federal government 
or due to the economic crises that hit the state at time of writing—if 
only we can manage to register the lessons learned, these experiences 
can be valuable in the future.34  
But to make sense of how a case changed the scenario that was 
presented before us, we should first take a look at the structure and 
functions of the Witness and Victims Protection Programme between 
2010 and 2011, and only then, move on to analysing our case. To 
do that we will begin by observing the legal framework of PROVITA 
and then pointing to the inadequacy of the programme in dealing 
with emergencies. 
                                                
34 Here we are not being naïve about this: on the contrary, we are adopting a 
position that one could consider to be an strategic kind of ‘optimism’: if we can 
register these experiences and reflect on our own failures and (small and transitory) 
successes, perhaps the results of this effort will last.  
For a similar use of the idea of optimism, see Costas Douzinas, ‘Welcome to the Age 
of Resistance’, (Open Democracy, 1 March 2014) 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/costas-douzinas/welcome-to-
age-of-resistance> accessed 7 November 2016. 
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The Witness and Victims Protection Programme  
(PROVITA) in Rio de Janeiro between 2010 and 2011  
and the Proposition of a New ‘Emergency Solve’ 
Programme (SEAPPA) 
There are three major federal acts that we have to bear in mind 
when addressing this issue, all of which share a common human 
rights approach to the protection of life and security of the person, 
and consequent interest in imposing a concern for the dignity of the 
human person on programmes that otherwise and elsewhere could 
be considered as merely pertaining to public security.  
PROVITA was created by Federal Statute No. 9,807 on 13 
July 1999, focusing on establishing protection to victims and 
witnesses who choose to ‘voluntarily collaborate with police 
investigation or criminal procedure’.35 Besides that, Enactment No. 
3,518, from 20 June 2000, established rules, norms and procedures 
of security and secrecy to PROVITA and created the Protection 
Programme for Special Convicts (SPDE) for the protection of the 
indicted and convicted.36 According to this enactment, the protection 
to people threatened with death would consist of a complex set 
group of programmes and policies, where PROVITA and SPDE 
would be joined by the Protection Programme for Children 
Threatened with Death (PPCAAM) and the Protection Programme 
for Human Rights Defenders (PPDDH). Also, we have to consider 
Enactment No. 4,671 from 10 April 2003, which approved the 
                                                
35 Brasil, LEI No. 9,807, 13 July 1999 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9807.htm> accessed 7 November  
2016. 
36 SPDE is particularly important as it complements PROVITA. The first (although 
it only exists in the federal level) is responsible for the protection of people after 
they are convicted or arrested. PROVITA specifically rules out witnesses under 
those situations. See art 2, s 2 of LEI No. 9,807, 13 July 1999: ‘Estão excluídos da 
proteção os indivíduos cuja personalidade ou conduta seja incompatível com as 
restrições de comportamento exigidas pelo programa, os condenados que estejam 
cumprindo pena e os indiciados ou acusados sob prisão cautelar em qualquer de 
suas modalidades. Tal exclusão não trará prejuízo a eventual prestação de medidas 
de preservação da integridade física desses indivíduos por parte dos órgãos de 
segurança pública.’ 
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internal rules of the programme and determined the number of 
personnel and roles they had to develop for the protection 
programme to work properly inside the Secretariat of Human 
Rights. However, that only applied at the national level. The idea 
behind these statutes and regulations is that state government bodies 
should follow and become responsible for implementing their own 
protection programmes over the years. To do that, they could count 
on financial support from the union or the federal government.37 
Rio de Janeiro was the first federate state to create its 
PROVITA,38 by state Statute No. 3,168/1999. However, as in most 
federate states, the effective implementation of the programme was 
achieved by a series of ‘administrative contractual agreements’ (or 
partnerships) between three actors: first, at the federal level, the 
SDH/PR, which invested almost 80% of the financial resources 
required to keep the programme running, would make a contractual 
agreement with a federate state body (in Rio, during 2010–11, this 
was SEASDH); then, SEASDH would provide the additional 20% of 
financial support for the programme, and propose a similar 
agreement—however, with much more difficult regulations and strict 
legislation—to an NGO. In addition to these three levels of financial 
administration (that includes the federal level); the state has also 
organised itself into three different levels of implementation of the 
programme: the political, executive, and technical levels.  
PROVITA’s political decision-making is the responsibility of a 
deliberative council (Conselho Deliberativo do PROVITA—
CONDEL), a multi-sectorial body composed of several public 
institutions, particularly from the administration of justice and the 
NGO under contractual agreement with the government. It is the 
task of the CONDEL to decide whether a victim or a witness of a 
                                                
37 Accoding to Paula Kapp, in 2010, 17 states had joined the National System of 
Protection: Acre, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Distrito Federal, Espírito Santo, Goiás, 
Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraná, Pernambuco, Rio de 
Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina e São Paulo. Witnesses who asked for 
protection, even in states that do not have PROVITA at the state level, would be 
supported by the federal programme. The only state that had a different 
programme was Rio Grande do Sul, which ran its own protection programme 
(Kapp (n 28) 4-5. 
38 ibid 14. 
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crime should enter the programme; this takes place during classified 
meetings into which not even the interested person is allowed. In 
addition, the CONDEL is mandated to make decisions on the 
improvement of the policy itself. The existence of this multi-
institutional council is further justified by the need to establish a 
‘checks and balances’ mechanism in which the rights of the person 
ought to be protected by each of the members, which are 
representatives of myriad institutions. 
At the other end of the spectrum stands the NGO, whose main 
responsibility is to hire technical staff that will closely monitor the 
wellbeing and the needs of witnesses and victims. It is also worth 
noting that the NGOs engaged in the protection programmes are 
usually those dedicated to human rights activism, thus reinforcing 
the human rights character of the protection programme. The team 
of professionals hired by the organisation—usually a lawyer, a 
psychologist and a social worker—also undertakes the difficult task 
of continuously assessing the risk of threat to and the level of 
autonomy enjoyed by those under protection. This is of utmost 
importance, especially because people under threat ought to be given 
a chance to design an entirely new plan of life.   
Finally, the state governmental human rights body closely 
monitors the regular execution of the programme by the NGO, both 
financially and technically. This includes demanding regular 
expenses reports in a quite complicated way—NGOs must, for 
example, declare how much they spend and present receipts under 
formal requisition, so that their commercial network of suppliers are 
not exposed to the whole bureaucratic process—and updates on the 
wellbeing of the programme’s beneficiaries.  
This tripartite system, as described above, has been developed 
mostly on a pragmatic basis. As one would expect, especially due to 
the complexities involved in protecting human lives, there have been 
and there continue to be myriad problems in the daily execution of 
PROVITA. 
Despite its de facto existence, the CONDEL has only very 
recently been established in a formal manner—by State Executive 
Order No. 43,047, approved on 22 July 2011. In any case, it was 
not functioning properly, as the meetings were attended only by 
representatives of a few organs, namely (and usually) the SEASDH, 
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the Public Prosecutors Office, the Bar Association and the NGO.  
After its formal establishment, all other public organs have 
nominated representatives and the meetings have gained 
considerable momentum, with great benefits to the debate on the 
protection policy. There is no doubt, however, that the CONDEL is 
still in its infancy, as there is still room for improvement in both its 
functioning and its effectiveness. 
Moreover, there are problems related to the timing of the 
inclusion of victims and witnesses in the programme, leading to the 
very unfortunate existence of a waiting list. It is of course 
unacceptable for a protection programme such as PROVITA that 
potentially threatened people are left waiting and remain in danger. 
Albeit unacceptable, this is explained by a number of factors. The 
procedure for entering in PROVITA starts with a request from a 
public prosecutor, the legal professional mandated by law to 
commence the criminal prosecution procedure. The regulation of 
PROVITA states that, apart from the existence of the death threat, 
the person needs to have been a witness or a non-fatal victim of a 
crime and this condition implies that he or she must contribute to 
securing a successful prosecution. Thus the public prosecutor, due to 
his or her legal mandate, is in a position to assess whether the 
witness or victim will be important for solving the crime. No person 
will therefore enter the programme without the request of such a 
professional. 
With the request, the person is then referred, usually by 
SEASDH or the president of the CONDEL, to the team of technical 
professionals hired by the NGO, who will assess the social, 
psychological, and other conditions of the person and close family 
and the risk involved. They will then issue a technical opinion. A 
formal procedure is formed and taken to the CONDEL, where the 
procedure is handed to one of the members of the council, on a 
rolling basis, for voting. This member will then write his or her 
vote—favourable or not—and take it to the next meeting of the 
CONDEL, when all votes are taken. Only then is the person able to 
enter the programme, which, as one can conclude, may easily take 
two months. 
The SEASDH’s monitoring of administrative contracts with 
the federal government and the NGO is also has its difficulties. As 
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mentioned above, there are several rules designed to guarantee the 
appropriate application of public resources. Therefore, correctly 
executing the contracts is sometimes nothing short of a Herculean 
task and an entire team of agile and specialised financial 
administrators would ideally be necessary to prevent delays and 
ensure the regular application of resources. At the moment, such 
contracts endure over a long period, through various sectors of 
different organs and professionals who check their compatibility 
with several norms,39 but who are not familiar with the particulars 
of the protection programmes and therefore do not understand the 
need for a flexible outlook when applying rules in extreme 
situations. It is thus absolutely necessary that legislation is reformed 
with the purpose of making extraordinary concessions for urgent 
situations such as those faced by prospective subjects of the 
protection programmes. 
Delays in the application of resources and in the decision-
making of the CONDEL have a deleterious impact on the efficiency 
of the entire system of protection, precisely because people under 
threat cannot wait for administrative procedures to take their due 
course. This is especially the case where there is an immediate 
vulnerability caused by recent threats.  
It is self-evident that measures ought to be taken to prevent 
delays. It is common sense that a threatened person should not wait 
more than 15 days, which is a perfectly reasonable timespan for 
procedures to develop. However, even 15 days is too much time for 
someone who is threatened by a potential murderer, therefore there 
must be an emergency system in place that deals with such cases and 
provides a minimum level of protection even before a formal risk 
and compatibility assessment. 
The ‘Daniel’ case is a dramatic example of how difficult it is to 
respond to the palpable risk of a threat and possibly imminent death 
with all such difficulties in place. There will be no references under 
                                                
39 Standard agreement, contract procedures and monitoring demands a thorough 
analysis from at least 10 people, including public officers from different 
government branches, and not counting among those the financial administrative 
staff from the NGO. Accordingly to State Resolution No. 217/2011, from the State 
Civil Secretariat, public officials may take up to 45 days to analyse that data.  
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this section of the paper: only testimony. This is a case where we, the 
authors of this article, will change our role with those of witnesses: 
we will only be able to report on what we have seen—such as in an 
ethnographical work. In addition, we will be putting to test not only 
the legal framework we have described, but also our theoretical 
assumptions on the topic.  
The ‘Daniel’ Case: On How Emergency and Necessity 
Shapes Human Rights Inside and Outside Legal 
Boundaries 
Late on a Friday afternoon, the phone of SDPDH rang several times, 
as three different NGOs were calling with the same news: a well-
known journalist and his family were going to be executed by a drug 
dealer in Babylon favela (slum)40—a territory almost completely 
controlled by ‘Comando Vermelho’ (Red Command), a dangerous 
drug-dealing faction. After contacting Daniel—our journalist—
SEASDH officers decided that he might be included under the 
protection of PROVITA or PPDDH, and that they needed to take 
him to a safer place, where he and his family could wait for the 
security procedures to take their course. However, even facing death, 
Daniel refused to leave the slum with the police: he did not trust 
them and said he would only leave accompanied by specialised 
human rights personnel from SEASDH. So, as promised by recent 
agreements with SESEG, the human rights department contacted 
CORE for the first time since the agreement. This was a specialised 
police task unit that was then supposed to answer for all protection, 
guard and transportation of witnesses cases in Rio—a recent 
improvement to protection programmes at that time. That would 
have made the case easier—or not, as we will point out later—but 
reality is always harder than theory.41 
                                                
40 The name of the favela (slum) has been changed to protect all involved and abide 
by the rules of the programme. 
41 On CORE, see for example Governo do Rio de Janeiro, ‘CORE Oferece Curso 
para Agentes do Comando Operações Táticas (COT) da Polícia Federal’ 
<http://www.policiacivil.rj.gov.br/exibir.asp?id=15160> accessed 27 October 2016. 
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CORE had only a few light combat car units, which were 
being used in an operation in another city, and, due to rush hour 
traffic, could not be immediately counted on. Daniel kept calling, 
saying that he might not last for another hour. So SEASDH officers 
decided to act: they asked CORE for one ‘trusted contact’ within the 
local police station near the Babylon favela, and after making 
contact with Inspector Hananias, they went off with their own car to 
the police station. There, Inspector Hananias had already summoned 
his own task force from the civil police and had also requested 
support from the military police quarters nearby—which he, himself, 
did not seem to fully trust.  
SEASDH officers kept waiting for CORE, and calling 
regularly, but traffic was too jammed. Daniel also kept calling, 
crying and begging to be rescued, with his family, from inside the 
favela. After half an hour had passed, SEASDH and Hananias asked 
the military police unit if they knew how to find the place inside the 
favela and how to get out. Without consulting their superiors—who 
would probably have called them off—SEASDH officers decided to 
take the risk and ‘invade’ the favela with the police. This happened 
at around 8 pm. It was agreed with the police that two cars from the 
military police with around 10 heavily armed soldiers would lead the 
way, alongside one car from the civil police—led by trusted 
Inspector Hananias—and that the SEASDH car should follow.  
On the way, several armed drug dealers (with machine guns) 
were seen; however, not a single shot was fired. There were even 
motorcycles circling the rescue force from a distance, with armed 
riders. There was some delay due to the time it took for the cars to 
park because there are no roads inside the favela. In order to find the 
hiding place of Daniel and his family, a code was set—a red shirt 
hanging by the window. By the time the family was inside the 
SEASDH car, another car had dropped by: four men came out, three 
of them armed, and shook hands with the military police officers, 
whom they seemed to know very well, and started asking to ask 
questions. Inspector Hananias and his four fellow policemen from 
the civil police were visibly disturbed. Understanding that they were 
now under siege, SEASDH officers had to get out of their car and 
also shake hands with the armed men. Bizarrely, the men asked to go 
along with the task force back to the police station—which was very 
surprising, and the cars went back with the three rescued members 
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of the family and the gang members. In hindsight, one can see that 
the possible corrupt relationship between the drug dealers and the 
military police was probably the reason why nobody was shot—and 
if they had waited for CORE, an escalation to armed conflict would 
probably have taken place.  
Daniel’s statement on why he was being threatened took place 
in the police station. However, his story was inconsistent. Officers 
from SEASDH decided then to apply the regular witness safety 
procedure: send away the local police and take Daniel and his 
family, guarded by CORE, to a safer neighbourhood that CORE 
would also leave so that only SEASDH would know the safe place of 
the family. During that time, SEASDH personnel were trying to 
figure out how to host the family—who had no other relatives in the 
state—within the time necessary for them be inserted into one of the 
available protection programmes. A text was sent and presented in 
emergency terms to the head of SEASDH’s financial department, 
asking for immediate money to hire a ‘safe place’ for at least two 
weeks, plus money for food—and that was all they got.  
SEASDH officers decided that, having no other options, they 
would have to ‘cheat’ the system (and the market) by moving the 
family from place to place every five days, telling hotels and hostels 
that they were people being placed in some kind of social assistance 
programme and that—more seriously—all expenses would be paid in 
three days (when, in fact, they knew that it might take at least three 
months for the emergency money granted to be transferred in 
payment).  
In the end, the case in itself did not lead to anything: the family 
did not want to join any protection programme, and also decided 
not to collaborate with any investigations. They decided to leave the 
state with what was left of their own resources. Before that, 
SEASDH officers attempted to obtain more information on the case 
and, in doing so, found out that there were serious issues involving 
political funding in the favela where Daniel was based. It involved 
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the direct intervention of drug dealers, local community leaders, 
politicians, and federal funding.42  
However, the concrete and immediate threats dealt with made 
clear that there was an urgent need for financial resources for 
emergency measures. After that, the state government granted—
first—R$ 20,000,00 (to be used every four months) to the SSDPDH 
protection programmes. That began to be used and requested on a 
regular basis—either by PROVITA, PPCAAM, PPDDH, and then 
during many other emergency situations where it seemed necessary 
to take someone to a safer place until legal measures were processed. 
Conclusions 
This quite dramatic narrative shows how urgent changes were 
needed in the entire system of protection in the state of Rio de 
Janeiro, and, more generally, in Brazil. Firstly, it is clear that one 
cannot implement any protection programme without establishing a 
close relationship—based on trust and highly specialised personnel—
with the security forces. Moreover, it is necessary that the different 
protection programmes be interconnected in an efficient manner. 
This would allow threatened people who are at the boundaries of 
two or more programmes to be easily included in one or another 
micro-system of protection. Finally, there must be an agile, 
exceptional, and extra-classified system of emergency protection. 
The proposal for the creation of a state integrated system of 
protection in the government of the state of Rio de Janeiro 
(SEAPPA) responds precisely to these challenges and the need for the 
coordination of actions already in place. This becomes even clearer 
when one realises that the spine of all protection programmes is the 
protection of the human person and this is why it extends to 
witnesses and victims, as well as to children, adolescents, and human 
rights defenders. Integration is also essential for keeping together 
myriad public policy sectors—such as anti-impunity, social 
                                                
42 Unfortunately, we cannot give more detail on what happened in the local area 
afterwards, as this would possibly identify the people and the community involved 
in the case.  
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assistance, public security, and justice initiatives—towards one, more 
important, objective: the protection of the life and physical integrity 
of the human person. Several directions were studied and some have 
already been taken, towards this wider objective. It should be self-
evident that the implementation of such a system would require 
wider investment of financial resources.  
After the case under examination, a tool was devised to meet 
the need for emergency financial resources. This was done based on 
the interpretation of a statute that allowed a certain amount of 
money to be taken by public administrators, with more flexible rules 
of execution, for the purpose of meeting secret expenses. Although 
this was a considerable advance, it is still not satisfactory, as the 
resources are never sufficient for housing, for example, and the rules 
are still quite strict, ultimately preventing some (necessary) expenses 
from being met. 
A very interesting idea was also developed, albeit not directly 
related to PROVITA. Within the Programme of Protection of 
Human Rights Defenders (PPDDH), a department of protection is to 
be created and specifically formed of police members specialising in 
devising protection mechanisms for threatened people. These police 
officers are to be volunteers, selected by a public procedure within 
the secretariat of public security. Once selected, they should be 
trained in human rights and receive special financial remuneration 
for developing such a specialised role. The administration of this 
department is to be directly linked to the human rights secretariat, 
something that will bring coherence to the system, under the 
principle of the mainstreaming of human rights. Despite having been 
created within PPDDH, as detailed above, once the system of 
protection is created, all programmes can easily benefit from the 
knowledge that will be developed within this department.   
Finally, it should be mentioned that it is not mandatory that 
the protection programmes are developed through NGOs. There are 
indeed several problems in the implementation of such programmes 
via organisations of civil society, mainly related to monitoring 
difficulties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments for 
implementation by them, the main one being that, in Rio de Janeiro, 
most threats are perpetrated by public agents. Protection by an 
organ of the state structure against agents employed by the same 
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state is seen as lacking in legitimacy by some sectors of civil society 
and by the victims of such threats. However, as there might be ways 
of linking the technical team to independent state institutions, the 
debate as to the best administrative model to be implemented is 
ongoing. 
All these difficulties make us wonder whether it is really 
possible to enforce human rights from inside the government using 
public policy measures when almost every human rights violation 
involves state or government agents in some way. Or are we destined 
to face the fact that every step towards a governmental 
implementation of human rights standards is necessarily minimal at 
best, and virtually ineffective at worst? 
Collaboration between SEASDH and SESEG has largely 
improved—for example, during the debates on PPDDH model—but 
that does not fully answer either of our questions. It is a fact that, 
increasingly, governmental officials—not only police officers, but 
also bureaucratic personnel—have been committing themselves to 
understanding human rights as basic standards for the re-shaping of 
policies, although in practice this might be more difficult to change. 
That is partially the ‘paradox of human rights’, as critical legal 
theory formulates it: the more human rights are legally accepted the 
greater the possibility that they will be violated or not fulfilled.43  
In practice, this paradox is best exemplified by the ‘Daniel’ 
case. SEASDH officers became, themselves, witnesses of a strange set 
of events that involved not only general (military) police corruption, 
but also an intricate network of corruption that ranged from the 
local police force and drug dealing level to, perhaps, the federal 
government. Nevertheless, they had to admit that what granted 
security to them on the occasion was, bizarrely, the corrupt 
relationship between the military police and the local drug dealers—
probably because no one fully knew what was really at stake on the 
occasion, as Daniel himself decided never to expose the entire 
situational context of threat.   
                                                
43 Costas Douzinas, ‘The Paradoxes of Human Rights’ (2013) 20(1) Constellations 
51. 
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It does seem, moreover, that despite these difficulties—or 
perhaps because of them—protection programmes benefited (albeit 
minimally, some could say) from the personal commitment of public 
officials inserted into the governmental structure, who felt 
challenged by an extremely difficult security environment and 
decided to compel implementation at the next level. This seems to 
confirm that the implementation of human rights public policies, 
particularly challenging ones, need officers committed to the cause, 
who are willing to transform problems into windows of 
opportunities. It is worth noting that this had not happened before 
in Rio de Janeiro, possibly as a result of all the challenges posed. 
It seems that, as our case shows, real advances were only made 
within a ‘resistance’ conception of human rights, i.e., when the 
system was set against itself. Emergency situations went beyond 
political agreements, shortening negotiations that would otherwise 
take years and expanding policy through an almost dialectical 
tension.  
